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ABSTRACT  
Over the next few decades air travel is predicted to grow, 
with international agencies, manufacturers and governments 
predicting a considerable increase in aviation use. However, 
based on current fuel type, International Civil Aviation 
Organization (ICAO) project emissions from aviation are 
estimated to be seven to ten times higher in 2050 than in 1990. 
These conflicting needs are problematic and have led to the EU 
Flightpath 2050 targeting dramatic emissions reductions for the 
sector (75% CO2, 90% NOX by 2050).   
One proposed solution, decreasing carbon emissions 
without stunting the increase in air travel, is hydrogen 
propulsion; a technology with clear environmental benefits. 
However, enabling the safe application of this fuel to aviation 
systems and industrial infrastructure would be a significant 
challenge.  High-profile catastrophic incidents involving 
hydrogen, and the flammable and cryogenic nature of liquid 
hydrogen (LH2) have led to its reputation as a more dangerous 
substance than existing or alternative fuels. But, where they are 
used (in industry, transport, energy), with sufficient protocols, 
hydrogen can have a similar level of safety to other fuels.  A 
knowledge of hazards, risks and the management of these 
becomes key to the integration of any new technology.   
Using assessments, and a gap analysis approach, this paper 
examines the civil aviation industry requirements, from a safety 
perspective, for the introduction of LH2 fuel use.  Specific 
proposed technology assessments are used to analyze incident 
likelihood, consequence impact, and ease of remediation for 
hazards in LH2 systems, and a gap analysis approach is utilized 
to identify if existing data is sufficient for reliable technology 
safety assessment.  Outstanding industry needs are exposed by 
both examining challenges that have been identified in transport 
and industrial areas, and by identifying the gaps in current 
knowledge that are preventing credible assessment, reliable 
comparison to other fuels and the development of engineering 
systems.  
This paper demonstrates that while hydrogen can be a safe 
and environmentally friendly fuel option, a significant amount of 
work is required for the implementation of LH2 technology from 
a mass market perspective. 
INTRODUCTION  
The increase in economic growth and prosperity worldwide, 
especially in the developing nations, has resulted in a steady 
increase in the use of air travel.  In the 27 years before 2010 
personal world air transport is reported to have increased by 
5.9% per year [1].  In January 2017 the International Civil 
Aviation Organization (ICAO) indicated the number of 
passengers reached 3.7 billion in 2016, a 6.0 per cent increase 
over the previous year [2]. The UK government estimates that 
demand for air travel from UK airports will rise between 1% and 
3% every year until 2050 [3], Airbus estimates that growth of air 
travel will increase by 4.5% each year until 2035, requiring 
33,000 new passenger aircraft [4], and International Air 
Transport Association (IATA) estimates that worldwide air travel 
will double between 2015 and 2035 [5].  
This growth has caused many to have concerns in relation to 
the environmental effects of kerosene based world-wide 
transport.  Aviation is a significant contributor to the emission of 
greenhouse gases (GHGs).  These are gases that have been 
identified as contributing to rising global temperatures such as 
carbon dioxide (CO2), and nitrogen oxides (NOx).  To address 
this, a number of regulatory and industry groups have issued 
mandates.  IATA has issued a global commercial aviation 
mandate to reduce net CO2 to 50% of 2005 levels by 2050 with 
carbon neutral growth from 2020 [6]. 
There is a general industry appreciation that a major step 
change will be required to produce the next generation of aircraft 
capable of providing the future required aviation service and 
further efficiencies while also factoring in environmental 
challenges.  
A number of novel ‘game-changing’ technologies have been 
proposed including distributed propulsion systems, boundary 
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layer ingestion, the use of cryogenic fuels (cryofuels) and the use 
of superconductors for electrical distribution and electrical 
propulsion. 
The use of cryogenic fuels is a complex proposition that 
would require large scale aircraft design, processes and 
infrastructure changes.  The production, transport, ground 
storage, refueling, on-board storage and the cooling/ combustion 
systems will all require new engineering solutions and 
supporting safety processes. 
This work will cover these suggested technologies on an 
aircraft, focusing on their associated hazards.  It will also identify 
the knowledge gaps that will need to be addressed to be able to 
fully assess the technology use safely. 
Hydrogen Gas propulsion in aviation 
Hydrogen gas has been explored for propulsion use in 
aerospace since before the Second World War. It is commonly 
used for propulsion in spacecraft (in combination with LOX) and 
is the fuel of choice (or part of the hybrid systems) for many of 
the proposed projects currently in development such as SpaceX, 
Skylon and SABRE and the EC ENABLEH2 project. 
Hydrogen is desirable in principle primarily because of its 
high heat of combustion, however its low density means 
significant space is required for on-board storage and the existing 
storage solutions have a significant weight penalty [7].  Usefully, 
hydrogen has a high specific heat capacity relative to kerosene 
meaning it can be used to as a coolant for the turbine etc., 
improving the efficiency of the system. 
While there have been recent papers looking at the 
conversion of existing engines, development of new engines and 
modelling of hydrogen combustion in those engine, few of those 
aircraft-focused studies have paid specific attention to the safety 
of those systems, both in terms of their lab use, and their 
integration into the wider aircraft industry.  However, a wider 
body of work has been built on liquid and gaseous hydrogen 
safety in wider industries such as transport and energy.  The 
following section will summarize the state of the art on hydrogen 
safety knowledge. 
HYDROGEN HAZARDS & SAFETY MANAGEMENT 
There are a range of hazards that must be assessed and dealt 
with to make technology using cryofluids safe.  The main areas 
to consider are physical hazards associated with temperature and 
pressure changes and chemical hazards associated with 
flammable events etc. 
Low temperature hazards for cryogenic fluids 
The primary issues associated with cryogenic fluids are low 
temperature hazards.  The primary issue for user safety is that of 
cryogenic burns (frostbite), but risk from asphyxiation must also 
be considered.   In relation to system safety, the cold fluid can cause 
solidification of contaminants, and blockages (solidified air), so 
systems should be sealed from external contamination.  The cold 
system surfaces can also result in oxygen enrichment of air 
nearby, which is of particular concern in the case of leaking 
flammable fluids.  Cold surfaces can accumulate solidified gases 
that subsequently melt and drip liquefied components of air, 
creating a hazard in that area. 
There is also an additional problem in relation to the leak of 
cryogenic flammable materials.  Although generally 
vaporization is expected in the case of LH2, if leaked for a period 
of time, it can cool the ground enough to cause pooling and to 
cause and oxygen enriched hydrogen ‘snow’ that would provide 
significant fire hazards.  These issues should also be considered 
around the supply chain, including in the creation and storage of 
cryogenic liquids. 
A leak of cryogenic fluid could potentially cause issues with 
onboard systems by cooling components (such as electronics) to below 
their minimum operating temperature. 
Pressure/ Expansion hazards for cryogenic fluids 
According to Molkov [8] there are significant hazards 
related to any system reliant on maintaining pressure and or low 
temperatures in relation to thermal expansion, boil-off, and 
pressure/ temperature maintenance and control . 
Care should be taken with any fuel to understand and 
monitor liquid-to-gas expansion ratios, overpressure hazard 
sources, overpressure hazard sources, pressurization/ cooling 
system failure, pressure relief system failure and fire hazards.  
Much of these properties are well understood as the cryofuels are 
all commonly used and stored in industry [9].   
Particular attention should be taken to define how the effects 
of changing pressures and temperatures in a relatively short 
space of time (flight profile) affect the storage and behavior of 
the cryofuels, and the effect of the continual repeated changes 
required for aerospace.  The repeated thermal expansion and 
contraction could create fatigue issues for LH2tanks. 
LH2 volume expands with heat significantly more than water 
(coefficient of thermal expansion at normal boiling point is 23 
times that of water at ambient conditions). Thermal expansion 
and contraction create problems for storage systems e.g. fatigue, 
unwanted stresses, propensity for leakage.  The behavior of any 
two-phase flows formed can be modelled but models have not 
been properly validated due to a lack of experimental data. 
One safety advantage is that LH2 releases are visible due to 
condensing of water/ gases in surrounding environment, 
although the visible region does not indicate the edge of the 
flammable zone.  The design of cryofuel systems must consider the 
possibility of contamination from improper purging leading to 
presence of condensable gases/solidified gas blockages, and 
contamination by fluids (pressurization gas, pump oils) and 
organic/ flammable matter from outside the system in enriched, 
condensed air. 
Embrittlement 
Low-temperature embrittlement by cryogenic fluids is 
possible, particularly for containment materials, and materials 
adjacent to the system.  Embrittlement is particularly a risk with 
cryogenic hydrogen.  The mechanical properties, particularly of 
metals and alloys, can be significantly reduced by exposure to 
the hydrogen fluid (maximum effect at 200 - 300K).  This 
includes changes in tensile strength, ductility, fracture toughness, 
and crack behavior.  Failures have resulted in the past [9] but this 
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can be avoided by using less susceptible materials.  The effect on 
such materials of prolonged airborne service in the presence of 
vibration is not clear. 
Flammable hazards 
In many ways, the greatest safety concern associated with 
hydrogen fuel is its wide flammability region, relative ease of 
ignition and explosive power.  Flammable hazards in relation to 
the majority of fuels are relatively well understood. Much work 
has been done to define the ignitability of hydrogen by flames, 
heat sources, and mechanical ignition/ sparks [10].  For 
hydrogen, safe management is essential as hydrogen has a higher 
laminar flame speed and very low ignition energy when 
compared to kerosene [11].  The low ignition energy for 
hydrogen (<0.02mJ) makes stringent ignition source control, and 
leak control and monitoring, even more important than for 
kerosene type fuels.  Ignition sources (BS EN 1127) should be 
avoided in regions where hydrogen may leak or collect.   
Most recently work has started to better define ignition 
properties of hydrogen, and hydrogen/methane mixtures, in 
relation to self-ignition, primarily by adiabatic compression/ 
shockwave ignition [12] [13] [14], but also charging of hydrogen 
causing electrostatic [15] and mechanical ignitions [16].  Much 
work is required to better define the parameters effects especially 
under variable environmental conditions.  
Work has also increasingly looked at medium to large scale 
ignition experiments [17] [18] [19], and modelling and 
validation of complex scenarios using computational fluid 
dynamics [17] [20] but further work is needed to explore this 
fully on the ground, and in air profile conditions, especially in 
order to validate modelling.  Brewer determines that in a series 
of large-scale release experiments no evidence of detonation 
could be found, and that pressure effects from a fireball were 
negligible when unconfined, however turbulence and obstacles/ 
geometry may play a key role in worsening this action [19].  
Hydrogen leaks easily through very small gaps [21] due to 
its low viscosity, and is adept at penetrating many solid materials. 
However, hydrogen has a shorter burn-time and lower thermal 
radiation if ignited, so the thermal radiation transfer is lower than 
for Jet-A fuel.  
Liquid hydrogen vaporizes rapidly on release, and gaseous 
hydrogen is relatively buoyant compared with air.  Outside these 
characteristics may be an advantage reducing the chance of a 
flammable mixture being formed, however internally hydrogen 
could collect in voids (if not designed out or vented). Hydrogen 
is invisible to the naked eye (and the majority of visualization 
methods), however on release of cryogenic LH2 the immediate 
condensation of air due to the cold makes the leaks highly visible 
[18]. 
From a functional perspective leaks of cryofuels can cause 
a reduction in volume of external gases, and can create a vacuum 
that can draw in yet more gas, e.g. oxidizer (air) creating a 
flammable atmosphere [8].  Boil-off and vent management is 
also needed for storage both on and off the aircraft.  This boil off 
must be carefully monitored and ventilated to prevent a 
flammable atmosphere from developing, or the hydrogen must 
be captured for further use. 
Particular attention will need to be paid to refueling 
technology and processes.   The transfer of fuel, and especially 
cryofuel such as LH2, creates a particularly dangerous window 
of time. The transfer is particularly problematic due to the large 
temperature differences encountered when refueling with fresh 
LH2. A liquid hydrogen system design could enable a sealed 
system, where a flammable mix cannot exist outside of the 
combustion chamber. Hydrogen leaks (or spills for liquid 
hydrogen) must be prevented and systems/ environments 
carefully ventilated and isolated from ignition sources to prevent 
any fire incidents.  In relation to LH2 Pritchard & Rattigan [21] 
state the consequences of an accidental spillage or leak are 
poorly understood, particularly the initial stages of pool spread 
and vaporization.  This will have significant impact on, for 
example, system design and refueling processes.  In relation to 
aircraft systems/components such as joints, pumps and 
compressors – both onboard and ground based pumping systems 
for cryofuels will need careful consideration in terms of their 
long term reliability, an area that has not been fully addressed for 
aviation duty.  A range of liquid hydrogen technology options for 
ground-based transport are being explored and introduced [22] 
and with this work further research is being done to understand 
the large scale safety implications. NASA is developing a rapid 
delivery and zero loss storage system, as part of their GODU- 
LH2/ GODU-O2 program [22].  Any system must obviously also 
be designed to prevent operator error.  
Modelling of hydrogen using FLACS has been well 
developed [23] but the understanding of leaks, dispersion and 
ignition/ fire/ explosion events under varying environmental 
conditions, particularly for large scale releases, have not been 
validated to any great degree as only limited experimental work 
has been performed in this area with specific release rates [19]. 
When released for a significant period of time (minutes) 
pooling can occur due to the cooling of the surrounding ground 
causing a flammable hazard below refueling areas.  Additionally 
an oxygen enriched hydrogen ‘snow’ can form.  The properties 
of this ‘snow’ are not well defined and this should be explored to 
understand how dangerous this material may be, and how prone 
to ignition [18] [19] [24]. 
Current safety regulation and guidance 
A significant base of research exists on hydrogen use for 
transport and power [25] [23] [17]. In practice, hydrogen has an 
excellent safety record compared to hydrocarbon fuels.  The 
safety issues around LH2 are highlighted by the ANSI/AIAA 
[26], Beeson [9], Molkov [8], and Pritchard & Rattigan [21].  
With safety protocols in place hydrogen is recognized as being 
as safe as any other fuel, even with some advantages [27] [28] 
[29] [30] e.g. hydrogen evaporates and disperses faster, has a 
shorter burn-time and emits less thermal radiation when ignited, 
and a sealed cryogenic system reduces ignition hazard.  
Substantial literature exists on hydrogen hazards and 
effective ways to characterize, manage and mitigate them in 
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ground-based transport and engineering systems.  Several 
standards for safe use of hydrogen/ flammable gases include:  
 ATEX Directives 99/92/EC & 94/9/EC 
 ISO TC/97 standards 
 NFPA 2 Hydrogen Technologies code 
 ANSI/ AIAA Guide to Safety of Hydrogen and 
Hydrogen Systems G-095-2004 
 ASME B31.12 Hydrogen Piping & Pipelines 
In Europe work on projects such as Hysafe [31], HyRam 
[32] as well as FCH JU KnowHy [33] and H2Trust [34] have 
resulted in analysis tools to assess H2 safety, and comprehensive 
guidance is used in nuclear environments [35]. Several airports 
(Heathrow, Berlin, Los Angeles) have introduced H2 fueling 
stations for ground support/ transport vehicles, thus safety and 
integration in existing infrastructure have been considered.   
A recent report [36] about hydrogen safety, concluded there 
was confidence the industry could adhere to international safety 
standards, and the concern had no significant effect on the 
support for the technology compared with other advantageous 
factors (e.g. environmental, cost). 
However, there are knowledge gaps, particularly in relation 
to new fuel usage in the aviation industry and the environmental 
impacts that will need to be addressed in order to develop them 
for use.   
The Cryoplane project [38] explored LH2 use in aircraft.  
The project safety tasks identified several major safety areas 
including bursting discs, lightning strikes, fire protection 
systems and the effect of bird strike  
Kotchourko et al [10] also identified hydrogen safety 
priorities requiring further research.  Relevant to the use of LH2 
for aircraft are: 
 The effect of weather and environmental conditions on 
physical properties,  phase changes and heat transfer 
properties (examining humidity, temperature, wind 
speed and direction, atmospheric stability class)  
 Greater depth on mechanical ignition 
 The effect of geometry of system components including 
pipework, nozzles impact on ignition/ self-ignition 
 Flame acceleration and deflagration to detonation 
(DDT) issues 
 Hydrogen releases from existing storage 
 Fireball scales, cooling and movement, especially for  
large clouds 
 
Again, Brewer [38] suggests igniting large releases in order 
to prevent more serious consequences from an explosion or 
DDT.  The thermal output from a hydrogen ignition is far lower 
than of a comparable hydrocarbon ignition and thus, it could 
perhaps be managed more effectively than the worst case 
scenarios.  This needs to be explored as part of the large and 
smaller scale release/ DDT scenarios.  
Recent advances in ground-based hydrogen systems safety 
and current projects are filling some of these areas of required 
development however not all gaps have been filled.  The 
following sections will examine risks in a proposed hydrogen 
propulsion system and the areas of need for further research 
work.   
METHODOLOGY – PHA & GAP ANALYSIS  
This section covers the methodology used for the 
preliminary Hazard List creation, the Preliminary Hazard 
Analysis, and the follow-on Gap Analysis process.   
A Preliminary Hazard Analysis (PHA) is often the first stage 
of a risk assessment process.  It is generally performed at the start 
of a task, and it can form the basis of later risk assessment 
methods.  The first stage of a PHA (MIL STD 882E) is the 
formation of a Preliminary Hazard List (PHL); a list of 
everything that can conceivably go wrong with a system or 
process.   
Two ready-made lists related to aerospace were used as a 
starting point (Hard et al (2012), Goldberg et al (1994)), but were 
not regarded as comprehensive.  The issues covered in the 
literature survey in this work added as hazards specific to 
hydrogen, and its use in aviation (including issues such as 
cryogenic hazards for LH2, as well as wide flammability limits, 
buoyancy, relative lack of a visible flame).  The specific 
scenarios identified in Lowesmith et al, Kotchourko et al, were 
also added to this process.  The PHL process covers both normal 
conditions (handling of hazardous system entities and ignition 
sources under expected flight conditions), and off-normal or 
fault-conditions (i.e. fault of component/system failure, operator 
error, and other out–of-tolerance issues). 
Following the systematic approach of the US DOD, a basic 
system architecture and division has been proposed (Figure 1) to 
analyses areas with similar hazard categories. This will form the 
framework for the hazard assessment.  It has been split into 4 
sections; 1) LH2 storage, 2) LH2 transport, heat exchange and 
expansion system, and 3) GH2 transport and heat exchange 
system, and 4) GH2 combustion system. 
Next an analysis was conducted around each hazard with an 
emphasis put on any area where the inclusion of hydrogen as a 
fuel significantly changed design or operational considerations.   
Each system was assessed for possible PHL hazards. Table 1 
shows the rationale employed.  Each hazard category has several 
sub-hazard types, and modes by which these hazards might come 
about (not an exhaustive list given early stage of design process).  
This work is a wide assessment of hydrogen hazards in this 
scenario, without specific system components making 
organization around category headlines more appropriate than 
around components.  The PHA is used to assess the likelihood 
and impact of various hazards and whether they could lead to any 
adverse incidents (Including ICAO annex 13 accidents where 
serious injury or adverse damage occurs) which affects, or could 
affect, the safety of operation for an aircraft incorporating a 
liquid hydrogen propulsion system.  The hazards are then also be 
analyzed to assess their ease of remediation.   
Having conducted this PHA process a gap analysis is 
conducted around each of the hazards/ system items/ areas using 
an approach similar to that used by the Hanson et al [37] & the 
US DOE for the nuclear industry.  The ‘further work required’ 
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section of the analysis (Table 1) is performed based on doubts in 
the risk assessment.  Where assessment is difficult due to lack of 
information/ data, and the safety case cannot be justified to a 
satisfactory degree, further work is required and the major safety 
barriers to technology development and uptake, and cross cutting 
needs for all systems are identified. 
Figure 1 A basic possible system architecture for a hydrogen 
propulsion system proposed in ENABLEH2 project 
LH2 storage
Pump(s)
Engine precooler (LH2)
Expander
Engine cooling systems 
(GH2)
Combustion system
LH2 on-board storage system
LH2 transport, heat exchange & 
expansion system
GH2 transport & heat exchange 
system
GH2 combustion system
 
Table 1 Preliminary Hazard Assessment & Gap Analysis framework 
Hazard 
mode 
number 
The number assigned to 
this system hazard for 
recall & auditing 
1 
Hazard 
category 
The broad classification 
of the hazard  
e.g. pressure 
Hazard 
type 
The type of hazard 
associated with that 
category 
e.g. pressure 
increase 
Modes/ 
info 
Possible mode(s) by 
which the hazard may 
occur in the system being 
examined (related to 
mechanism and 
components)  
e.g. warming 
from external heat 
and increased boil 
off  
Outcomes/ 
notes 
(separate 
out) 
The resulting negative 
issues that occur. 
e.g. over-
pressurisation, 
tank leak/ breach, 
cryogenic (cold) 
damage, potential 
fire/ explosion. 
S1 (1-4) The unmitigated severity 
of the outcomes (where 1 
is catastrophic and 4 is 
negligible a) 
1 
L1 (A-E) The unmitigated 
likelihood of the incident 
(where A is frequent and 
E is Improbable a)  
A 
Mitigation The known mitigations 
that can be performed to 
reduce severity and/ or 
likelihood 
E.g. Pressure 
relief devices, 
hydrogen capture, 
venting capability 
S2 (1-4) The severity of the 
mitigated incident 
outcomes a 
3? 
L2 (A-E) The likelihood of the 
mitigated incident a  
A? 
Further 
work 
required 
Are there areas of doubt, 
missing data or 
knowledge gaps that 
require addressing to 
enable complete risk 
assessment 
Engineering 
solutions 
required, and 
mechanism info 
on boil-off in 
flight profile 
conditions 
References For decision origin/ audit EIGA 06/02 
? Where doubts exist around the technology solutions or there 
is lack of data underpinning the decision, a. Severity/ likelihood 
categories defined in MIL-STD-882E. 
RESULTS 
The Preliminary hazard assessment activity produced a 
document of several pages that is difficult to demonstrate in this 
work.  The following section summarizes the findings.  Although 
there was substantial cross-over the main relevant hazard 
categories and types were identified for each system (Table 2) in 
relation to specific hydrogen hazards beyond the normal activity 
of a liquid hydrocarbon fuel aircraft.  
All of the major categories listed were applicable for all four 
of the systems assessed, though to different degrees of likelihood 
and severity. The hazard type sub-groups for the two liquid 
hydrogen systems (1 and 2) were largely similar, with some 
differing modes given the different nature of storage versus a 
multi component pump, heat exchange and expansion system.  
The third and fourth system hazards types did not contain the 
same cryogenic hazards, but were also otherwise similar, with an 
additional issue of DDT concern in the combustion system.  
Common themes of containment & structural integrity, 
ventilation and inerting and preclusion of ignition, and a lack of 
aviation appropriate information were clear and could be seen in 
the attempts to remove, alter or mitigate the hazards.   
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Table 2 Hazard categories and types found to be relevant in hydrogen 
propulsion preliminary risk analysis process 
Hazard 
category Hazard type 
LH2 GH2 
S TH TH C 
Pressure 
Containment 
failure/ release x x x x 
Pressure increase  x x x x 
Temperature 
High temperature x x x x 
Low temperature x x x x 
Fire 
Flammable 
atmosphere x x x x 
Fire properties x x x x 
Ignition source 
present x x x x 
Flameout       x 
Explosion/ 
Rupture 
Overpressure/ 
seismic wave x x x x 
Boiling Liquid 
Evaporating 
Vapour Explosion x       
Confined 
Explosion   x x x 
Deflagration to 
detonation     x x 
Mechanical 
Impact x x x x 
Vibration  x x x x 
Strain manoeuvre x x x x 
Thermal Acoustic 
Oscillation (TAO)   x   x 
'Fluid hammer'   x     
Chemical 
Ortho-para 
conversion x       
Contamination  x x     
GH2 low viscosity x x x x 
Diffuse/  buoyant x x x x 
Compatibility x x x x 
Leak/ spill General leakage   x x x 
Physiologica
l 
Cold burn x x     
Asphyxiation. x x x x 
Heat Burn x x x x 
Contingency 
Fire suppression x x x x 
Fire fighting x x x x 
Venting x x x x 
Purging x x x x 
Earthquake x x x x 
Extreme weather  x x x x 
x = system is affected by this hazard. LH2 = Liquid hydrogen 
systems, GH2 = Gaseous hydrogen systems, S = Storage, TH = 
Transport & heat exchange, C = combustion.  
Having conducted the Preliminary Hazard Analysis process 
a number of knowledge gaps have been identified that require 
further research work, engineering solutions or further 
consideration in design.  Table 3 contains these by hazard group 
however the following section details some of the major 
outstanding issues. 
A large number of these issues relate to the new application 
of a direct hydrogen burning propulsion system to civil aviation.  
While hydrogen has been used in aviation, and space travel, 
successfully developing systems that can withstand the rigorous, 
continual, use, requiring fast turnaround, for civil aviation 
requires a different level of reliability. Consideration must be 
given to the impact of take-off, landing, changing flight profile, 
vibration, strain on storage vessels, and fuel systems 
(engineering and on-going supporting systems). 
Another area where a great deal of consideration is needed 
is on how to make leaks safe during refueling and throughout 
flight profile (varying environmental conditions).   Internally 
ventilation, inerting, fire suppression for hydrogen and other 
fires all need to be considered.  Explosion mitigation including 
tank and system siting, space fillers (such as metal networks), 
blast walls or vent panels also need to be explored for suitability.  
All of these issues will have to be considered in the selection of 
design of storage and system siting.  Placement of storage on the 
wing reduces capacity for escaped fuel to collect, but in a worst-
case scenario, such as an explosion, could result in catastrophic 
wing damage.  Placement of tanks inside the fuselage risks 
collection of fuel and formation of a flammable atmosphere, as 
well as difficulties in terms of placement (above, below 
passenger, or even in between cock-pit and passengers have been 
explored).  However, a sealed section could be reinforced and be 
less susceptible to impact from projectiles, and be more resilient 
in an emergency landing or crash scenario. Use of materials, 
particularly composite, though also any materials for system 
(including cryogenic, and combustor) use will need to be 
considered.  Increased safety may mean increased weight.   
The flammability and ignition of hydrogen at altitude are not 
well understood.  The dispersion, and ignition of hydrogen in 
cold temperatures at low pressure and temperature needs to be 
better understood, as well as ways to detect these.  The jet fire 
and explosion capability must also be further explored in these 
conditions.   
Accidental release issues would also need to be considered 
in terms of the larger scale releases that may be possible to the 
outside refueling environment. Analysis of volume, storage 
facility location, and precautionary and mitigation methods in 
case of leaks although this will be the subject of future studies in 
this work program.  
The larger scale issues such as dispersion internally in 
aircraft or externally at airports during refueling need 
considerable further research.   
In terms of liquid hydrogen systems control and perhaps use 
of hydrogen boil-off needs to be explored.  The reliability of 
cryogenic systems and the materials that make them up under 
aviation conditions will again have to be tested.  The effect of the 
ortho-para conversion for liquid hydrogen following liquefaction 
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on the flight systems, ground storage systems and the time that 
takes will have to be explored.   
Finally, in relation to the combustion chamber, the relight 
ability of fuel to maintain engine, whilst also not risking a 
detonation is a serious consideration, and the chance of thermo-
acoustic damage from hydrogen combustion oscillations needs 
to be further explored to prevent structural effects. 
 
Table 3 Further areas for research required for safe introduction of 
hydrogen propulsion derived from gap analysis 
Hazard type 
Further work identified to support 
Liquid Hydrogen propulsion systems 
High pressure 
containment 
failure/ 
inadvertent 
release 
 
Impact of take-off, landing, changing flight 
profile, vibration on storage vessels. 
Consideration to tank siting required for 
assessing safety impact and mitigations. 
Further consideration needed to how to 
make LH2/ GH2 leaks/ release safe during 
refuelling and throughout flight profile 
(varying environmental conditions) 
Increase in 
internal 
system 
pressure 
Further work needs to be done to 
characterise this problem and engineer 
venting/ inerting solutions for flight 
operation.   
 
Vibration effects require significant 
consideration.  
 
Consideration to tank and system siting 
required 
 
Further work needed to characterise risk 
from moisture/ freezing causing this 
problem and to engineer solutions to prevent 
for flight operation 
High 
temperature/ 
Heating 
elements 
Further work will be required to examine 
novel materials (e.g. composite) for safe 
aircraft use, fuel tank protection and fuel 
tank insulation - weight being a factor 
 
Further work is needed to understand the 
engineering solutions required, and 
mechanism of off gassing across flight 
profile conditions 
 
Further work is needed to define hydrogen 
ignition mechanism and probabilities under 
flight conditions (range of environmental 
conditions. 
Low 
temperature 
Engineering solutions are required to 
maintain the integrity of systems under 
aviation conditions 
 
Further work will be needed to define the 
reliability of materials in cryogenic and cold 
environment conditions for aviation 
applications 
Flammable 
atmosphere 
formation 
Further work is required to define 
flammability of hydrogen across flight 
profile conditions (flame speed, 
flammability limits). 
 
Further work is needed to understand liquid 
hydrogen leak dispersion and collection 
across flight profile conditions. Venting/ 
inerting tech 
 
More research work is needed on large-scale 
longer-term releases (spillage of large 
quantity of LH2 on ground, and water, cloud 
dispersion of cold hydrogen and ignition, 
safety distances) 
Fire properties 
The behaviour of jet fires under aviation/ 
flight profile conditions needs to be 
explored more fully.  
Deflagration 
to Detonation 
(DDT) risk 
Further work needed to determine risk of 
deflagration to detonation involving 
hydrogen fuel throughout GH2 systems and 
risk of shockwave development in 
combustion system. 
Ignition 
source present 
Further work is needed to define ignition 
probabilities under flight conditions from 
mechanical impacts/ friction, electrical 
apparatus, coronal discharge, Radio 
frequency (at airport given possible loop 
structure and transmitters). 
 
Further work is needed to understand the 
ignition capability, and engineering 
requirements to protect LH2 storage 
materials from lighting strike 
 
This is needed across flight profile 
conditions. Engineering solutions may be 
different in different stages of aircraft 
operation. 
Flameout 
A specific issue for the combustion system 
is that of flameout and relight. A flammable 
cloud of hydrogen reigniting could result in 
a blast wave, vibration and damage to fuel 
and other systems, while not relighting 
could result in worse formation of a larger 
flammable atmosphere and worse onward 
effects. Auto-recovery systems including 
auto-relight systems are therefore required. 
Various options exist to mitigate this hazard 
including either stopping shock wave 
formation by using lean mixture below 
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detonable level, ensuring immediate ignition 
on entry to combustion chamber, avoid  
geometries that promote flame 
acceleration/DDT or making systems 
capable of withstanding a shockwave. 
Blast 
overpressure/ 
seismic wave 
Further work is needed to explore the 
dangers to aircraft of system explosions in 
different section of plane, explosion 
avoidance & mitigation methods, and from a 
Boiling-Liquid-Evaporating Gas explosion.  
Work to examine the survivability from 
fireball ignition, rather than a developing 
blast wave should be explored. 
Confined 
explosion 
Further work is needed to define solutions 
and mitigations for ignition of leaks.    
Ventilation, inerting, fire suppression and 
explosion mitigation, including tank and 
system siting, space fillers (such as metal 
networks), blast walls or vent panels also 
need to be explored for suitability.  Tank 
and system siting will also need 
considerable thought.  
Boiling Liquid 
Evaporating 
Vapour 
Explosion 
(BLEVE) 
The blocking of any pressure relief on 
storage vessels could result in an 
overpressurisation leading to a serious 
explosion, blast wave or possible a BLEVE. 
Prevention of an explosion is greatly 
favoured (pressure relief with redundancy 
and diversity, and prevention of formation 
of a flammable atmosphere plus exclusion 
of ignition sources) however, it may be 
necessary to have explosion venting 
capability in case of a serious 
overpressurisation. 
Impacts/ 
collision with 
protected item 
Further work is needed to assess this issue 
with Liquid Hydrogen in relation to tank 
isolation, geometry and design in relation to 
sloshing liquids. 
 
Further work is required to define the risk 
of, and from, events such as loose object 
impact, acceleration/ deceleration/ gravity, 
and Fragments/Missiles. E.g. Engine rotors/ 
fans disks burst and other uncontained 
engine failure, bird strike 
Vibration 
Consideration of aircraft motion will need to 
be considered when adapting existing, and 
designing all new systems, particularly 
given the leak-prone nature. 
Strain 
manoeuvre 
Consideration of extreme aircraft motion 
will need to be considered and its impact on 
hydrogen systems. 
Thermo-
acoustic 
vibration  
Further work is required to understand the 
existence and impact of possible thermos-
acoustic oscillations  
Ortho-para 
conversion 
Impact of this property of LH2 will need to 
be assessed in terms of on-board (and other) 
storage 
Contamination 
Engineering and design work is required to 
ensure systems are not contaminated with 
air which could form a flammable 
atmosphere, or anything that could result in 
a blockage.  
Fluid 
compatibility 
 Further work is needed to understand 
hydrogen effects on materials 
embrittlement, and diffusion for LH2 and 
GH2, particularly for new materials. 
 
Further work required on composite 
materials in cold, cryogenic environment 
and across a varying flight profile 
temperature. 
 
Further work also required to understand 
leaks or diffusion in systems under pressure.  
General 
leakage to 
external of 
system 
Further work is needed to define the 
dispersion and collection of LH2 and 
GH2leaks.  
 
Additionally detection methods suitable for 
use in aviation conditions need to be 
investigated. 
Contingencies: 
Fire 
Further work is required to identify fire 
suppression capability in aviation for 
hydrogen flames, or inerting systems, as 
well as firefighting factors.  
Additional 
consideration 
Additional areas for examination for all 
of these issues are integrity and effects during 
take-off and landing, changing 
environmental conditions, vibration, and 
longevity/ continual use factors associated 
with civil aviation aircraft.   
DISCUSSION 
The current state of the art in relation to liquid hydrogen 
safety and use in aviation has been explored and a theoretical 
hydrogen propulsion system (proposed as a possible basic 
architecture in the ENABLEH2 project) examined for risks and 
hazards.  A gap analysis has been conducted to identify key 
issues (with critical or catastrophic outcomes) and cross cutting 
issues (affecting multiple systems).  
The PHA and gap analysis show that a significant level of 
research and engineering will be needed to enable the 
development of a liquid hydrogen propulsion system.  
 For liquid hydrogen systems a key area for examination is 
the release of large volumes of Liquid Hydrogen. A great deal of 
work is still required to fully understand the behavior, dispersion, 
and pooling abilities of a large liquid hydrogen releases.  The true 
danger is that ignition of these leaks is also not well understood.  
As safe use and production of LH2 is becoming accepted in 
ground-based energy and transport systems, there is now wider 
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acceptance of hydrogen as a future aircraft fuel.  Some practical 
work by Hooker et al (2012) examines some of these issues, but 
further modelling, and in some cases validation, is needed to be 
able to reliably predict risks and mitigation/ remedial actions that 
could enable the use of this material safely at, for example, 
airports in large volumes.   
There are a series of cross-cutting issues that are relevant for 
all of the system sections examined.  The rapid vaporization and 
dispersion characteristics of potential leaks must be carefully 
explored and evaluated with suitable visualization or leak 
detection techniques identified.  Engineering solutions exploring 
venting or inerting will be required where leaks cannot be ruled 
out.  Early detection of minor leaks and cracks would also be 
necessary before they become serious or fail catastrophically. 
The Ignition mechanisms & combustion phenomenon of 
cryogenic or cold hydrogen across flight profile conditions (e.g. 
low temperature, low pressure environments) has not been 
explored to a great degree and needs further exploration.  
Understanding the risk from static/ coronal discharge, lighting 
and electrical storms and mechanical impacts must be explored 
further to understand and quantify (probabilistically) the risks.  
Little consideration appears to have been given to the danger 
from Radio frequency ignition at airports. 
Suitable materials are needed for use in aviation that can 
withstand a range of conditions (pressure build up, thermal 
contraction, hydrogen embrittlement, weather) while reliably 
performing containment of the cryogenic or flammable fuel.  As 
the use of composites increases (e.g. in hydrogen tanks) 
understanding the behavior and effects will be necessary. 
One major cross-cutting issue, and a possible barrier to 
technology use, is freezing hazard in relation to safety and 
emergency components (e.g. pressure relief) and it is likely 
engineering solutions will be required to prevent this hazard.  
Mechanical and impact hazards such as the effect of bird 
strike, uncontained engine failures, and premature failure in 
vibrating environments will all need to be explored.  The danger 
from sloshing liquids in terms of tank damage is a hazard that 
does not appear to have been explored.   
H2 is more prone to deflagration to detonation transition 
(DDT) than most other fuels so the flameout, flood and re-
ignition hazards must be assessed as well as the propensity for 
DDT in the GH2 systems.   
Additionally the different operational modes including take-
off, operation across varying environmental conditions of flight 
profile, safe carry of passengers, staff and cargo, landing, and 
refueling, as well as vibration effect on systems and use across 
long time period, for multiple flights, must be considered for 
each system, and hazard.  The majority of this information is not 
currently available and testing and engineering solutions will be 
required to address these issues.    
ACKNOWLEDGMENTS 
This work has received funding from the EPSRC 
Institutional Sponsorship ATI Propulsion Theme Support ATI-
PPS-CU-16, and is part of a project that has received the 
European Union’s Horizon 2020 research and innovation 
programme under grant agreement No 769241 
REFERENCES 
[1]  M. Mazraati, “World aviation fuel demand outlook,” 
OPEC Energy Rev., vol. 34, no. 1, 2010. 
[2] ICAO, “Traffic growth and airline profitability were 
highlights of air transport in 2016,” International Civil 
Aviation Organization, 2 Janury 2017. [Online]. 
Available: 
https://www.icao.int/Newsroom/Pages/traffic-growth-
and-airline-profitability-were-highlights-of-air-
transport-in-2016.aspx. [Accessed 4 October 2018]. 
[3] UK Department for Transport, “UK Aviation 
Forecasts,” Department for Transport, United 
Kingdom, 2013. 
[4] Airbus, “Over 33,000 new planes valued over US$5 
trillion for the next 20 years,” Airbus Group Ltd, 11 
July 2016. [Online]. Available: 
https://www.airbus.com/newsroom/press-
releases/en/2016/07/over-33-000-new-planes-valued-
over-us-5-trillion-for-the-next-20-years.html. 
[Accessed 4 October 2018]. 
[5] IATA, “IATA Forecasts Passenger Demand to Double 
Over 20 Years,” IATA, 18 October 2016. [Online]. 
Available: 
https://www.iata.org/pressroom/pr/Pages/2016-10-18-
02.aspx. [Accessed 4 October 2018]. 
[6] C. Bil and T. Conroy, “Life-cycle analysis for 
alternative aviation fuels,” Journal of Aerospace 
Operations, vol. 4, no. 1-2, pp. 5-29, 2016. 
[7] D. Verstraete , “The Potential of Liquid Hydrogen for 
long range aircraft propulsion. Ph. D. Thesis,” 
Cranfield University, 2009. 
[8] V. Molkov, “FUNDAMENTALS OF HYDROGEN 
SAFETY ENGINEERING,” University of Ulster, 7 
September 2009. [Online]. Available: 
http://www.hysafe.org/science/eAcademy/docs/4thessh
s/presentations/ESSHS2009MolkovVV.pdf . [Accessed 
4 October 2018]. 
[9] H. Beeson, K. Farrah, M. Leuenberger, M. Maes, L. 
Starritt and S. Woo, “Safe Use of Hydrogen and 
Hydrogen Systems.,” NASA Safety Training Center., 
2016. [Online]. Available: 
https://ntrs.nasa.gov/archive/nasa/casi.ntrs.nasa.gov/20
070018005.pdf. [Accessed 4 October 2018]. 
[10] A. Kotchourko, D. Baraldi, P. Bénard, P. Eisenreich, T. 
Jordan and J. Keller, ““State of the art and research 
priorities in hydrogen safety,” European Commission 
Joint Research Centre of the European Commission 
(JRC), Brussels, 2014. 
[11] J. Gummer and S. Hawksworth, “Spontaneous ignition 
of hydrogen HSE RR615,” UK Health & Safety 
Executive, Buxton ,UK, 2008. 
 10 Copyright © 2019 by ASME 
[12] P. Hooker, M. Royle, D. Willoughby and J. Udensi, 
“Self ignition of hydrogen by various mechanisms,” in 
IChemE HAZARDS XXII, Liverpool, 2011. 
[13] W. Rudy, A. Dabkowski and A. Teororczyk, 
“Experimental and numerical study on spontaneous 
ignition of hydrogen and hydrogen-methane jets in air,” 
International Journal of Hydrogen Energy, vol. 39, no. 
35, 2014. 
[14] W. Rudy, A. Teodorczyk and J. Wen, “Self-ignition of 
hydrogen–nitrogen mixtures during high-pressure 
release into air,” International Journal of Hydrogen 
Energy., vol. 42, no. 11, 2016. 
[15] J. Ingram, A. Averill, P. Battersby, P. Holborn and P. 
Nolan, “Electrostatic ignition of sensitive flammable 
mixtures: Is charge generation due to bubble bursting 
in aqueous solutions a credible hazard?,” Process 
Safety and Environmental Protection, vol. 92, no. 6, 
pp. 750-759, 2014. 
[16] A. Averill, J. Ingram, P. Holborn and P. Battersby, 
“Energy losses during drop weight mechanical impacts 
with special reference to ignition of flammable 
atmospheres in nuclear decommissioning: theory and 
determination of experimental coefficients for impact 
analysis and prediction,” International Journal of 
Impact Engineering, vol. 109, pp. 92-103, 2017. 
[17] M. Kuznetsov, A. Friedrich, G. Stern, N. Kotchourko, 
S. Jallais and B. L'Hostis, “Medium-scale experiments 
on vented hydrogen deflagration,” Journal of Loss 
Prevention in the Process Industries, vol. 36, pp. 416-
428, 2015. 
[18] P. Hooker, D. B. Willoughby and M. Royle, 
“Experimental releases of liquid hydrogen.,” in In 
Proc. 4th Int. Conf. on Hydrogen Safety., San 
Francisco, 2012. 
[19] J. Hall, P. Hooker and D. Willoughby, “Ignited releases 
of liquid hydrogen: Safety considerations of thermal 
and overpressure effects.,” International Journal of 
Hydrogen Energy, vol. 39, no. 35, pp. 20547-20553, 
2014. 
[20] M. Ichard, O. Hansen, P. Middha and D. Willoughby, 
“CFD computations of liquid hydrogen releases,” 
International Journal of Hydrogen Energy, vol. 37, pp. 
17380-17389, 2012. 
[21] D. Pritchard DK and W. Rattigan, “Hazards of liquid 
hydrogen. Position Paper. RR769 Research Report,” 
UK Health and Safety Laboratory, 2010. 
[22] K. Stolzenburg, S. Whitehouse and N. Whitehouse, 
“EU CHIC Project. Experiences with the 
implementation of infrastructures for hydrogen 
refuelling and lessons for future installations,” EC 
(FCH JU) New Energy World Joint Undertaking, 
Brussels, 2014. 
[23] W. Notardonato, W. Johnson, A. Swanger and T. 
Tomsik, “Ground operations demonstration unit for 
liquid hydrogen,” NASA, 27 July 2015. [Online]. 
Available: 
https://ntrs.nasa.gov/archive/nasa/casi.ntrs.nasa.gov/20
150014259.pdf. [Accessed 4 October 2018]. 
[24] E. Vyazmina and S. Jallais, “Validation and 
recommendations for FLACS CFD and Eng. 
approaches to model H2 Vented Explosions,” Int. J. of 
Hydrogen Energy, pp. 15101-15109, 2016. 
[25] M. Royle and Willoughby, DB, “Releases of un-ignited 
liquid hydrogen.,” HSE Books, Sudbury, 2014. 
[26] B. Lowesmith, G. Hankinson and S. Chynoweth, 
“Safety issues of the liquefaction, storage and 
transportation of liquid hydrogen: studies in the 
IDEALHY project,” in International Conference on 
Hydrogen Safety, Brussels, 2013. 
[27] ANSI, “American National Standard Guide to Safety of 
Hydrogen and Hydrogen Systems G-095-2004,” 
American Institute of Aeronautics and Astronautics , 
Reston, VA, USA, 2004. 
[28] A. Dahoe and V. Molkov, “On the development of an 
international curriculum on hydrogen safety 
engineering and its implementation into educational 
programmes,” International Journal of Hydrogen 
Energy, vol. 32, no. 8, 2007. 
[29] F. Edeskuty and W. Stewart, Safety in the Handling of 
Cryogenic Fluids, New York: Springer Science, 1996. 
[30] J. Saffers and V. Molkov, “Hydrogen safety 
engineering framework and elementary design safety 
tools,” International Journal of Hydrogen Energy, vol. 
39, no. 11, 2014. 
[31] K. Verfondern, “Safety considerations of liquid 
hydrogen,” Energy & Environment, vol. 10, 2008. 
[32] HySafe, ““EU Hydrogen Safety Handbook,” EC 
funded Network of Excellence (NoE) HySafe, 2007. 
[Online]. Available: 
http://www.hysafe.net/wiki/BRHS/BRHS. [Accessed 
27 06 2017]. 
[33] K. Groth and E. Hecht, “HyRAM: A methodology and 
toolkit for quantitative risk assessment of hydrogen 
systems,” International Journal of Hydrogen Energy, 
vol. 42, no. 11, 2017. 
[34] KnowHy EU FP7-project, “KnowHy: Improving the 
Knowledge in Hydrogen and Fuel Cell Technology for 
Technicians,” European Commission; Fuel Cell and 
Hydrogen Joint Undertaking, 29 09 2015. [Online]. 
Available: http://knowhy.eu/. [Accessed 16 10 2017]. 
[35] H2TRUST , “Cordis H2TRUST Report Summary,” 
European Commission, 17 12 2015. [Online]. 
Available: 
http://cordis.europa.eu/result/rcn/174284_en.html. 
[Accessed 16 10 2017]. 
[36] I. Kempsell, M. Wakem, M. Fairclough and J. Ingram, 
“Hydrogen explosions-an example of hazard avoidance 
and control,” INSTITUTION OF CHEMICAL 
ENGINEERS SYMPOSIUM SERIES,, vol. 148, pp. 
523-540, 2007. 
[37] T.-Y. Chen, D.-R. Huang and A. Y.-J. Huang, “An 
empirical study on the public perception and 
 11 Copyright © 2019 by ASME 
acceptance of hydrogen energy in Taiwan,” 
International journal of green energy , vol. 13, no. 15, 
pp. 1579-1584, 2016. 
[38] Cryoplane (EU project), “FINAL TECHNICAL 
REPORT,” European Commission, Brussels, 2003. 
[39] G. Daniel Brewer, Hydrogen Aircraft Technology, 
New York: Routledge, 1991. 
[40] B. Hanson, H. Alsaed, C. Stockman, D. Enos, R. 
Meyer and K. Sorenson, “USED FUEL DISPOSITION 
CAMPAIGN. Gap Analysis to Support Extended 
Storage of Used Nuclear Fuel,” U.S. Department of 
Energy , 2012. 
[41] M. Kuznetsov, G. Kobelt, J. Grune and T. Jordan, 
“Flammability limits and laminar flame speed of 
hydrogen–air mixtures at sub-atmospheric pressures,” 
International Journal of Hydrogen Energy, vol. 37, no. 
22, pp. 17580-17588, 2012. 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
